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Criminal Procedure-Ellis v. Reed: Constitutionality and
Coerciveness of Judicial Inquiry into the Numerical
Division of a Jury
In Braoy/eld v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court
held that it is reversible error for a federal district court judge to inquire into the numerical division of a jury unable to agree on a verdict.2 The Court found reversal "essential to the fair and impartial
conduct of the trial," 3 because such an inquiry generally tends to be
coercive.4 Although many state courts have addressed the issue of judicial inquiry into the numerical division of a jury,5 very few have considered the possible constitutional implications of the BraTfield
decision. Even these few have split on the question whether Brasfield
laid down a constitutional prohibition against such a judicial inquiry.'
In Ellis v. Reed,7 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, in a case of first impression for that court, rejected the view
that Braosfeld established a due process rule of constitutional interpretation applicable to the states by reason of the fourteenth amendment, 8
and instead held that the Bra~feld rule is "one of judicial administration based on the supervisory powers of the Supreme Court over the
federal court system." 9 The appropriate question for determining
whether a state court defendant is entitled to relief, therefore, is not
simply whether the judge inquires into the numerical division of the
jury, but whether, under the totality of applicable circumstances, the
inquiry and any accompanying charge by the judge have a coercive
effect on the jury.' 0
Ellis v. Reed arose out of a 1976 North Carolina state court conviction of appellant Ellis for embezzlement." On direct appeal, the North
1. 272 U.S. 448 (1926).
2. Id at 449-50.

3. Id at 450.
4. Id
5. See generally Annot., 77 A.L.R.3d 769 (1977) and cases collected therein. This Note does
not attempt to collect all of the numerous decisions involving judicial inquiry into the numerical
division of a jury.
6. See cases cited notes 40, 41 & 47 infra.
7. 596 F.2d 1195 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 468 (1979).
8. Id at 1197.
9. Id
10. See id at 1200.
11. Following a jury trial, appellant was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for not
less than three nor more than five years. Brief for Appellant at 2.
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Carolina Court of Appeals reviewed the conviction and found no error
in the trial. 2 After the Supreme Court of North Carolina denied a writ
of discretionary review,' 3 appellant petitioned the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina for a writ of
habeas corpus. Finding that appellant's constitutional right to trial by
an impartial jury had not been violated by the trial judge's inquiry into
the numerical division of the deadlocked jury and his subsequent deliv-4
if reasonably possible,'
ery of a supplemental charge urging a verdict
15
the district court dismissed the petition.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court.' 6 The primary issue addressed
by the court was whether Brasfeld's per se prohibition of numerical
inquiry was based on the Constitution or on the Court's supervisory
powers over the administration of justice in the federal courts.' 7 After
12. State v. Ellis, 33 N.C. App. 667,236 S.E.2d 299, cert. denied,293 N.C. 255, 236 S.E.2d 708
(1977).
13. State v. Ellis, 293 N.C. 255, 236 S.E.2d 708 (1977).
14. Ellis v. Reed, No. 77-392-HC, slip op. at 4 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 21, 1978).
After a three day trial, the jury was instructed and it retired to deliberate. After a period of
time, the jury returned to the courtroom for additional instructions and then retired again. On
their second return, the following colloquy, which resulted in the controversy, occurred:
COURT: Mr. Foreman, have you reached a verdict?
JURY FOREMAN: No, Your Honor, we have not.
COURT: Will you tell me numerically what is the division; not what each of you were,
but the numerical division.
JURY FOREMAN: Eleven to one.
COURT: Well, I presume, ladies and gentlemen, that you realize what a disagreement
means; that the time of the Court will again have to be consumed in the trial of this
action. I don't want to force you or coerce you or attempt to do so in any way to reach a
verdict but it is your duty to try to reconcile your differences and to reach a verdict if it
can be done without the surrender of anyone's conscientious convictions; and you heard
the evidence in this case, and a mistrial will mean that another jury will have to be
selected to hear this case and the evidence again; and it's long and complicated. The
Court recognizes sometimes that there are reasons why jurors cannot agree, but I want to
emphasize the fact that it is your duty to do whatever you can do to reason this matter
over as reasonable men and women and attempt to reconcile your differences if it is
possible without the surrender of any conscientious convictions on the part of any member of the jury. I will let you resume your deliberations and see if you can reach a
verdict.
The jury then retired again to deliberate, and returned a guilty verdict within eight minutes. 596
F.2d at 1196.
15. Ellis v. Reed, No. 77-392-HC (E.D.N.C. Mar. 21, 1978). The district court held that
neither the inquiry nor the supplemental charge was coercive. The Brasfeldrule was found not to
be controlling as it was a supervisory federal rule and "an example of the Supreme Court's setting
of rigorous standards for its own trial courts rather than ... a decision on the lowest common
denominator permitted the states by the Constitution." Id, slip op. at 3.
16. 596 F.2d 1195 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 468 (1979).
17. The appellant also assigned as error the giving of a supplemental charge, a modified
version of the "Allen charge." See note 14 supra. The court found no error in the instruction
because it believed that the charge was not coercive in any manner. The court emphasized that
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reviewing the history of the rule and the split of opinion it had produced in the state courts, the court held that the Brasield decision
promulgated only a rule of procedure for the federal court system, and,
therefore, was not applicable per se to the state courts.' The court
based its holding on a combination of factors including the lack of constitutional citation in Brasfield,the language employed by the Supreme
Court in disapproving of the practice in a pre-Brasfeld decision, the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the relationship between constitutional requirements and state jury trials, and principles of federalism.19
Having disposed of the Braoteld rule, the court went on to find that,
even viewed within the totality of the circumstances, the verdict of the
jury in Ellis was not a product of coercion, and that habeas corpus
relief was thus improper."
In a strong dissent, Circuit Judge Winter disagreed with the majority2' on the applicability of the Braield rule to state criminal trials. 22
Relying on the language of the Brayield Court, he concluded that the
the trial judge twice told the members of the jury it was their duty to attempt to reconcile their
differences "if it was possible without the surrender of any conscientious convictions on the part of
any member of the jury." 596 F.2d at 1196-97.
The Allen charge, or a modification of it, frequently accompanies a judicial inquiry into the
numerical division of a deadlocked jury. This instruction originated in Allen v. United States, 164
U.S. 492 (1896), in which the United States Supreme Court upheld an instruction paraphrased by
the Court as follows:
that in a large proportion of cases absolute certainty could not be expected; that although
the verdict must be the verdict of each individual juror, and not a mere acquiescence in
the conclusion of his fellows, yet they should examine the question submitted with candor and with a proper regard and deference to the opinions of each other, that it was
their duty to decide the case if they could conscientiously do so; that they should listen,
with a disposition to be convinced, to each other's arguments; that, if much the larger
number were for conviction, a dissenting juror should consider whether his doubt was a
reasonable one which made no impression upon the minds of so many men, equally
honest, equally intelligent with himself. If, upon the other hand, the majority was for
acquittal, the minority ought to ask themselves whether they might not reasonably doubt
the correctness of a judgment which was not concurred in by the majority.
Id at 501. The Allen charge, often called the "dynamite charge" or "hammer instruction," is very
controversial and has been condemned by many courts as coercive. For a collection of cases on
this subject, see Annot., 100 A.L.R,2d 177 (1965), and for commentary, see Note, The Allen
Charge: RecurringProblems andRecent Developments, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 296 (1972); Comment,
Defusing the Dynamite Charge: 4 Critique ofAllen and its Progeny, 36 TENN. L. REv. 749 (1969);
Comment, DeadlockedJuries andDynamite: A CriticalLook at the "Allen Charge," 31 U. CHi. L.
REv. 386 (1964); Note, Due Process,JudicialEconomy and the Hung Jury: A Reexamination of the
Allen Charge, 53 VA. L. REv. 123 (1967); Note, On Instructing Deadlocked Juries, 78 YALE L.J.
100 (1968).
18. 596 F.2d at 1200.
19. See notes 50-63 and accompanying text infra.
20. 596 F.2d at 1200.
21. Senior District Judge Hoffman (sitting by designation from the Eastern District of Virginia) wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Judge Haynsworth joined.
22. 596 F.2d at 1201-02 (Winter, J., dissenting).
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rule of that case "is a rule of constitutional interpretation of the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment and it is therefore applicable to
the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. '2 3 He therefore would
have invalidated the conviction and granted
the writ unless North Car24
again.
appellant
the
try
to
decided
olina

Traditionally, the trial judge has been given a great amount of
flexibility and discretion in dealing with the conduct of a criminal trial
and the participants involved in the proceeding. This is especially true
of the judge's relationship with the jury. But problems may arise when
the jury has trouble reaching a verdict. It has been held proper for a

trial judge to recall a deliberating jury in order to ascertain what difficulties its members are having in considering a case, and to make

proper efforts to aid in the solution of those difficulties. 25 "A judge
may advise, and he may persuade, but he may not command, unduly
influence or coerce."' 26 Jurors can be very receptive and responsive to

the actions of the judge and any suggestion that may be made concerning their conduct.27 Therefore, interrogation of the jurors pertaining to
their difficulties must be carried out with the utmost care and circumspection to avoid any improper pressure upon the jury 28 or even reflection upon the abilities of the jurors themselves.29 Actions of the trial
judge, such as inquiry into the numerical division of a jury, must be
examined closely, and sometimes a fine line must be drawn between

practices that may be proper in assisting the jury and those that are
improper as adversely affecting defendants' rights.30
The practice of inquiring into the numerical division of a federal
23. Id at 1201 (Winter, J., dissenting).
24. Id (Winter, J., dissenting).
25. Allis v. United States, 155 U.S. 117, 123 (1894); see United States v. Smoot, 463 F.2d
1221, 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1972); State v. Middleton, 218 S.C. 452, 457, 63 S.E.2d 163, 165 (1951); 0.f,
Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896) (upholding charge urging verdict).
26. Wissel v. United States, 22 F.2d 468, 471 (2d Cir. 1927); see State v. Boogaard, 90 Wash.
2d 733, -, 585 P.2d 789, 792 (1978); Annot., 85 A.L.R. 1420 (1933).
27. Taylor v. State, 17 Md. App. 41, -, 299 A.2d 841, 844 (1973); see State v. Sanders, 552
S.W.2d 39, 40 (Mo. App. 1977) ("Basic principles ofjury trial require jurors to perform their role
free from extraneous factors. In the eyes of many jurors the trial judge can do no wrong; his word
is law and jurors are sensitive to what he says and does.").
28. United States v. Smoot, 463 F.2d 1221, 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
29. A juror's decision should not be influenced by personal considerations. A judge should
not make remarks which could be interpreted as reflecting upon a juror's honesty, integrity or
intelligence if the juror fails to follow the suggestions of the judge. See State v. Bybee, 17 Kan.
462, 466 (1877); In re Henderson, 4 N.C. App. 56, 60, 165 S.E.2d 784, 788 (1969).
30. "The basic question . . . is whether the remarks of the court, viewed in the totality of
applicable circumstances, operate to displace the independent judgment of the jury in favor of
considerations of compromise and expediency." People v. Carter, 68 Cal. 2d 810, 817, 442 P.2d
353, 356, 69 Cal. Rptr. 297, 302 (1968) (en banc).
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jury was first condemned by the United States Supreme Court in Burton v. UnitedStates. 3 The Court found that the knowledge of the pro-,
portion of the division of the jury is not needed by the trial judge in
order to deliver a proper supplemental charge, and, furthermore, that
the practice might lead to improper influences.3 2 The conviction in
Burton, however, was reversed on other grounds, and subsequent federal court decisions split on the issue whether the condemnation of numerical inquiries in Burton was merely hortatory or constituted a
finding of reversible error. 3 In 1926, the Supreme Court settled the
issue in Bra fteld v. United States34 by holding such inquiries to be reversible error per se.3 5 After noting the conflict among the circuits, the
Brasfield Court concluded:
We deem it essential to the fair and impartial conduct of the
trial, that the inquiry itself should be regarded as ground for reversal.
Such procedure serves no useful purpose that cannot be attained by
questions not requiring the jury to reveal the nature or extent of its
division. Its effect upon a divided jury will often depend upon circumstances which cannot properly be known to the trial judge or to
the appellate courts and may vary widely in different situations, but
in general its tendency is coercive. It can rarely be resorted to without bringing to bear in some degree, serious although not measurable, an improper influence upon the jury, from whose deliberations
31. 196 U.S. 283 (1905). In Burton, the trial judge asked the members of the jury how they
were divided numerically, but not whether they stood for conviction or acquittal. The jury foreman responded that they were divided eleven to one. The judge then proceeded to give a supple-

mental instruction and sent the jury back into deliberations. Id at 305.
32. Specifically, the Court stated:
[A] practice ought not to grow up of inquiring of a jury, when brought into court
because unable to agree, how the jury is divided; not meaning by such question, how
many stand for conviction or how many stand for acquittal, but meaning the proportion
of the division, not which way the division may be. Such a practice is not to be commended, because we cannot see how it may be material for the court to understand the
proportion of division of opinion among the jury. All that the judge said in regard to the
propriety and duty of the jury to fairly and honestly endeavor to agree could have been
said without asking for the fact as to the proportion of their division; and we do not think
that the proper administration of the law requires such knowledge or permits such a
question on the part of the presidingjudge. Cases may easily be imagined where a practice of this kind might lead to improper influences, and for this reason it ought not to
obtain.
Id at 307-08.
33. Compare Quong Duck v. United States, 293 F. 563 (9th Cir. 1923) and Bernal v. United
States, 241 F. 339 (5th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 672 (1918) (not prejudicial error) with
Nigro v. United States, 4 F.2d 781 (8th Cir. 1925); Stewart v. United States, 300 F. 769 (8th Cir.
1924) and Saint Louis & S.F.R.R. v. Bishard, 147 F. 496 (8th Cir. 1906) (reversible error).
34. 272 U.S. 448 (1926).

35. Id at 450. In Brafeld, the trial judge recalled the jury and inquired into the numerical
division after the jury had been deliberating a few hours. The foreman informed the court that
the jury was divided nine to three, but did not indicate their division on the issue of conviction or
acquittal. Id at 449.
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every consideration other than that of the evidence and the law as

expounded in a proper charge, should be excluded. Such a practice,
which is never useful and is generally harmful, is not to be sanctioned.3 6

Although Bra,56eld's prohibition of numerical inquiries has

become firmly established as the rule in the federal courts,37 there is a
sharp division among the state courts over the basis for the Braoyfeld
decision and the coerciveness of the numerical inquiry. Braoeld left
open the question whether the Supreme Court intended the rule to be a
constitutional rule, based upon the right to a fair trial by an impartial
jury,38 and thus applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, or whether the Court was only exercising its supervisory powers
over the administration of justice in the federal court system.3 9

Some state courts, faced with the issue of judicial inquiry into the
numerical division of a jury, have followed Braofteld and condemned

the practice per se.40 A few of these courts have viewed Braosfeld in a
36. Id at 450.
37. See, e.g., United States v. Noah, 594 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1979). See generall I E. DEVirr
& C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 5.22 (3d ed. 1977).
38. U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI & XIV; see, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968);
Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445 (1965) (per curiam).
39. The Supreme Court has the power to supervise the lower federal courts, and it can develop rules for these courts that are not mandated by the Constitution. The Court discussed this
power in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), in which it stated:
[W]hile the power of this Court to undo convictions in state courts is limited to the
enforcement of those "fundamental principles of liberty and justice," . . . which are
secured by the Fourteenth Amendment, the scope of our reviewing power over convictions brought here from the federal courts is not confined to ascertainment of Constitutional validity. Judicial supervision of the administration of criminal justice in the
federal courts implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of
procedure and evidence. Such standards are not satisfied merely by observance of those
minimal historic safeguards for securing trial by reason which are summarized as "due
process of law" .
Id at 340.
Thus the Supreme Court, through its inherent supervisory powers, can develop rules of administration for the federal courts that are not constitutionally required and therefore not applicable to the states. Indeed, the Supreme Court cannot develop a rule of procedure for the state
courts unless the rule is constitutionally required. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 523 (1972).
For this reason, the Court cannot exercise the same corrective power over state courts that it
exercises over federal courts. See Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 471 (1958). The Supreme
Court must respect the laws of the individual states, and its only authority over state trials is to
determine whether the Constitution has been violated. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165,
168 (1952); United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 68 (1944).
The Ellis court thought a judicial inquiry into the numerical division of the jury was analogous to the supplemental instruction given by the state court judge in Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S.
141 (1973). 596 F.2d at 1200. The Cupp Court found that the instruction, though condemned in
the federal courts, did not violate due process. The Court ruled that even if the federal courts
unanimously condemned the instruction, a state court conviction could be overturned only if the
instruction violated a fourteenth amendment right. 414 U.S. at 146.
40. E.g., State v. Streyar, 119 Ariz. 607, 583 P.2d 263 (Ct. App. 1978); Taylor v. State, 17 Md.
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constitutional light. Only one court, however, has explicitly adopted

the Brasfield rule as a constitutional rule,4 'while, arguably, two others
have implicitly found Bra.field to be a constitutional decision.4 2 Other

courts have followed Brafield without indicating its constitutional im-

plications.4 3 Still others have apparently concluded that the Brasfield

rule is not constitutionally mandated, but have, nevertheless, adopted
the rule for other reasons.'

On the other hand, the majority of state court decisions dealing
with the propriety of such an inquiry have not followed Braj/eld.45
These courts have found no error, or at the most harmless error, in the
App. 41, 299 A.2d 841 (1973); People v. Wilson, 390 Mich. 689, 213 N.W.2d 193 (1973); State v.
Aragon, 89 N.M. 91, 547 P.2d 574 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 89 N.M. 206, 549 P.2d 284 (1976); State
v. Middleton, 218 S.C. 452, 63 S.E.2d 163 (1951) (following Braieldin cases in which the jury's
division regarding conviction or acquittal is also revealed); Kersey v. State, 525 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn.
1975); see Commonwealth v. Robinson, 102 Pa. Super. Ct. 46, 156 A. 582 (1931); Commonwealth
v. Anthony, 91 Pa. Super. Ct. 518 (1927); Commonwealth v. McCain, 39 Del. Co. 331 (Pa. 1952);
cf Hyman Reiver & Co. v. Rose, 51 Del. 397, 147 A.2d 500 (1958) (civil case) (dictum). But see
Commonwealth v. Bellino, 44 Del. Co. 285, 71 York Leg. Rec. 107 (Pa. 1957) (no error). See
generally Annot., 77 A.L.R.3d 769, §§ 3, 5(a) (1977).
41. State v. Aragon, 89 N.M. 91, 547 P.2d 574 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 89 N.M. 206, 549 P.2d
284 (1976). "Because the error goes to a 'fair and impartial' trial, the error violates due process.
Accordingly, Brasfield v. United States ... applies to New Mexico courts." Id at 97, 547 P.2d at
580.
42. See Taylor v. State, 17 Md. App. 41, 299 A.2d 841 (1973); People v. Wilson, 390 Mich.
689, 213 N.W.2d 193 (1973).
The Ellis court viewed Wilson as establishing a constitutional rule along with Aragon. 596
F.2d at 1198. The court did not construe Taylor in the same light. It emphasized the Taylor
court's consideration of "the total conduct of the trial judge" in making its decision. Id. (quoting
17 Md. App. at -, 299 A.2d at 845). Appellant Ellis has viewed all three cases, Aragon, Wilson
and Taylor, as establishing constitutional rules. Petition for Certiorari at 13. The court in Ellis
appears to have made the correct interpretation of these three cases. Aragon is an expressly constitutional decision, and Wilson, with its emphasis on the coerciveness of the practice, also appears to
be a constitutional interpretation of Brafeld. See 390 Mich. at 692, 213 N.W.2d at 195.
The arguments for viewing Brafield as a constitutionally based decision rely heavily on the
Supreme Court's statement in Braseldthat it is "essential to the fair and impartial conduct of the
trial, that the inquiry itself should be regarded as ground for reversal." 272 U.S. at 450. These
arguments also accept the Court's conclusion that the practice generally tends to be coercive. See,
e.g., Ellis v. Reed, 596 F.2d at 1201-02 (Winter, J., dissenting); State v. Cornell, 266 N.W.2d 15,
21-22 (Iowa) (Rawlings, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 947 (1978); Taylor v. State, 17 Md.
App. 41, -, 299 A.2d 841, 845 (1973); People v. Wilson, 390 Mich. 689, 692, 213 N.W.2d 193, 195
(1973); State v. Aragon, 89 N.M. 91, 97, 547 P.2d 574, 580 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 89 N.M. 206,
549 P.2d 284 (1976); Petition for Certiorari at 8-12, Brief for Appellant at 6-12, Ellis v. Reed, 596
F.2d 1195 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 468.
43. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Anthony, 91 Pa. Super. Ct. 518 (1927); State v. Middleton,
218 S.C. 452, 63 S.E.2d 163 (1951) (following Brafieldto extent jury's division regarding conviction or acquittal is revealed).
44. State v. Streyar, 119 Ariz. 607, 609, 583 P.2d 263, 265 (Ct. App. 1978) (following Brasfield
at least when the inquiry is communicated in absence of and without notice to defendant-a
practice condemned by Arizona law); Kersey v. State, 525 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Tenn. 1975) (reversible error because improper procedure affecting judge-jury relationship). See note 64 & text accompanying notes 82-85 infra.
45. See generally Annot., 77 A.L.R.3d 769, §§ 4, 6 (1977).
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inquiry alone, and have examined the actions of the judge in the light
of the totality of surrounding circumstances to determine whether any
coercion prejudiced the defendant. 6 Some of these courts have specifically rejected the Brasfeld rule, finding it to be a rule of procedure
developed by the Supreme Court in the exercise of its supervisory powers over the lower federal courts.4 7 These courts have accordingly

found themselves free to develop their own rules concerning the propriety of a judicial inquiry into a jury division. Among the courts that do
not follow Bra,5feld, there is a difference of opinion about the value of

an inquiry into the jury's numerical division. Some approve of the
practice, when the jury's division pertaining to conviction or acquittal
is not disclosed, as a reasonable means of determining the probability
of agreement among the jurors.4 8 Other courts disapprove of the practice but do not find it reversible error.4 9

Amidst this conflict of decisions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decided Ellis v. Reed. While recognizing

the sharp division of authority on the issue, the Ellis court chose to
46. E.g., People v. Carter, 68 Cal. 2d 810, 87, 442 P.2d 353, 358, 69 Cal. Rptr. 297, 302
(1968) (en banc), quotedat note 30 supra; Lowe v. People, 175 Colo. 491, 496, 488 P.2d 559, 561
(1971); Wilson v. State, 145 Ga. App. 315, 320, 244 S.E.2d 355, 359 (1978) (cer. denied); People v.
Duszkewycz, 27 II. 2d 257, 262, 189 N.E.2d 299, 302 (1963); State v. Cornell, 266 N.W.2d 15, 19
(Iowa), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 947 (1978); State v. Baker, 293 S.W.2d 900, 905-06 (Mo. 1956);
Joyner v. State, 484 P.2d 560, 562 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
The totality test has also been used in the federal courts in the examination of habeas corpus
petitions. See Jones v: Norvell, 472 F.2d 1185, 1186 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973);
Marsh v. Cupp, 392 F. Supp. 1060, 1063-64 (D. Or. 1975), ai'd,536 F.2d 1287 (9th Cir.), cer,
denied,429 U.S. 981 (1976).
47. See, e.g., Muhammad v. State, - Ga.-,-,
254 S.E.2d 356, 359 (1979); Wilson v. State,
145 Ga. App. 315, 324-25, 244 S.E.2d 355, 362 (1978) (cert. denied); State v. Cornell, 266 N.W.2d
15, 19 (Iowa), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 947 (1978); Sharplin v. State, 330 So. 2d 591, 596 (Miss. 1976);
State v. Morris, 476 S.W.2d 485, 489 (Mo. 1971); State v. Boogaard, 90 Wash. 2d 733, -, 585 P.2d
789, 792 (1978); f Marsh v. Cupp, 392 F. Supp. 1060, 1063 (D. Or. 1975), aj'd, 536 F.2d 1287
(9th Cir.), cer. denied, 429 U.S. 981 (1976) (habeas corpus petition).
48. See People v. Carter, 68 Cal. 2d 810, 815, 442 P.2d 353, 356, 69 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300 (1968)
(en banc); Frazier v. State, 93 Ga. App. 204, 204, 91 S.E.2d 85, 85 (1956); Sharplin v. State, 330 So.
2d 591, 596 (Miss. 1976); State v. Baker, 293 S.W.2d 900, 905 (Mo. 1956); Joyner v. State, 484 P.2d
560, 562 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
In Wilson v. State, 145 Ga. App. 315, 244 S.E.2d 355 (1978) (cert. denied), the Georgia Court
of Appeals concluded that an inquiry is proper if information on the jury's division between conviction and acquittal is not revealed. To avoid this situation, the court developed the following
procedures:
[I]t is suggested that a court should state the question, affirmatively, negatively, and illustratively, e.g.: "Tell me how you stand numerically-that is, whether you are 6 and 6, 8
to 4, etc., BUT DO NOT TELL ME WHETHER THAT NUMBER IS FOR GUILT
OR INNOCENCE. Do you understand my question?"
Id at 320, 244 S.E.2d at 360 (emphasis in original); see note 80 in/ta.
49. E.g., Lowe v. People, 175 Colo. 491, 495-96, 488 P.2d 559, 561 (1971); State v. Cornell,
266 N.W.2d 15, 19 (Iowa), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 947 (1978).
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construe the Brasfield decision as establishing a federal rule of administration rather than a constitutional limitation upon state criminal tri-

als."

Although it acknowledged that the language of Brasfield5 t

contained possible constitutional overtones, 52 the court noted that Bras-

field cited no provisions of the Constitution.
of constitutional citation,

4

3

Although this absence

in combination with the reluctance of the

Supreme Court to decide a case on constitutional grounds unless it is
absolutely necessary, supports a reasonable conclusion that Brafeld
was decided only as a supervisory rule of judicial administration, the
interpretation of the Ellis court is subject to criticism.
The Ellis court chose to rely on the language of Burton, in which
the Supreme Court said "we do not think that the proper administra-

tion of the law requires such knowledge or permits such a question on
the part of the presiding judge. '55 When Brasfield is read in conjunction with this language, according to the Ellis court, there emerges an
administrative rule, based on the Supreme Court's supervisory powers,

that is not binding upon the states. 56 This emphasis by the court on the
Burton "administration of the law" language may be misplaced. The
Supreme Court only addressed the inquiry issue in passing at the end
of the Burton decision. Twenty-one years later, the Court fully ex-

amined the issue in Bra7field and condemned a judicial inquiry into the
numerical division of a jury with much more forceful language than
that used in Burton. Dissenting in Ellis, Judge Winter placed greater
emphasis and importance on this explicit language of BraTfield-"essential to the fair and impartial conduct of the trial" and "is coer-

cive" 5T-in deciding that Brasfield was aimed at a constitutional
50. 596 F.2d at 1200.
51. "We deem it essential to the fair and impartial conduct of the trial, that the inquiry itself

should be regarded as ground for reversal." 272 U.S. at 450.
52. 596 F.2d at 1197.
53. Id.

54. Appellant attempted to counter this factor by arguing that "[tihe absence of constitutional
reference in Braoreldreflects nothing more than that, at the time of the decision in Braofeld, (1)
the supervisory-constitutional distinction was insignificant, and (2) the Court frequently determined matters of constitutional import without reference to specific constitutional provisions."
Petition for Certiorari at 8. In support of the first proposition appellant contended that, at the
time Bra 6feld was decided in 1926, it was unnecessary for the Court to distinguish its decision on
a constitutional-supervisory basis because the sixth amendment and its specific guarantees had not
been incorporated into the fourteenth amendment. Id at 9 & n.l. For an illustration of the
second proposition, appellant cited Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1930), as a constitutional decision involving cross-examination questions in which no constitutional provisions were
cited. Petition for Certiorari at 9-10.
55. 196 U.S. at 308, quoted in 596 F.2d at 1197-98.
56. 596 F.2d at 1197-98.
dissenting).
57. 272 U.S. at 450, quotedin 596 F.2d at 1201 (Winter, J.,
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objective. 8 Thus, the Burton language may not be as important as the
Ellis court suggested.59
The court reinforced its conclusion that Brasfield only established

an administrative rule of procedure by examining the Supreme Court
decisions considering the relationship between federal constitutional
requirements and state jury trials. 60 The court emphasized that, although the sixth amendment right to trial by jury had been applied to
the states, 6' the Supreme Court had recognized that states may deviate
62
from common law jury characteristics without denying due process.
This reasoning should be rejected, as Judge Winter argued in dissent,63

because these common law jury deviations involved only formal aspects of the jury that do not go to the fairness of the jury trial itself. A
practice such as a judicial inquiry into the numerical division of a jury,
which may be "coercive" and exert an "improper influence" upon jurors, clearly should be distinguished from procedural formalities of the

jury trial right that do not coerce the jurors.
Although the interpretative arguments of the Ellis court can be
criticized, the court's ultimate conclusion that Braftield established an
administrative, rather than a constitutional, rule is amply supported by
an examination of the reasons that the Supreme Court gave for its deci-

sion in Brasfield. These reasons can be broken down into three major
categories: (1) the practice is coercive; (2) the inquiry invades the province of the jury and affects the proper judge-jury roles; and (3) the practice is useless. Of these three categories, the first carries the most

significant constitutional implications.' 4
58. 596 F.2d at 1201-02 (Winter, J., dissenting); see Brief for Appellant at 8-12; Petition for
Certiorari at 8-12.
59. In his Petition for Certiorari, appellant cited several constitutional decisions and references which contain some of the same language used in Bra.Tfeld-United States v. Wood, 299
U.S. 123, 147-48 (1936) ("essential to the impartiality of the jury"); Alford v. United States, 282
U.S. 687, 692 (1931) ("safeguards essential to a fair trial"); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276,
294 (1930) ("fair"). Petition for Certiorari at 9-11. Appellant also tried to rebut the majority
opinion's reliance on the Burton "administration of the law" language by citing Sinclair v. United
States, 279 U.S. 749, 765 (1929), as an example of a constitutional decision in which the Supreme
Court referred to a juror's proper judgment role as "essential to proper enforcement of law."
Petition for Certiorari at 11.
60. 596 F.2d at 1199.
61. Id (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)).
62. Id (citing Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972) (less than unanimous jury verdict);
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (less than 12 member jury)); see Brief for Appellees at 6.
63. 596 F.2d at 1202 n.* (Winter, J., dissenting).
64. The second reason for the BragAeld rule, the "judge-jury relationship," is arguably of a
more limited constitutional nature than the coercion issue. It can be, and often is, intertwined
with the coercion issue, so that the two are difficult to separate. But in this Note, the separate
'judge-jury relationship" factor is viewed as a procedural explanation for Brayfeld. The separate
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The coercion issue6 5 was raised in Bra,5eld when the Supreme
Court found that an inquiry by a judge into the numerical division of a
jury generally tends to be coercive and improperly influential upon the
jury.6 6 This factor has been relied on by those courts finding the practice reversible error. 67 When the majority-minority count is revealed to
the court, prejudice may result. The judge must guard against pressuring the jury into reaching a verdict in which the minority accepts the
majority view without concurring in it. The influence of the judge-the
powerful, omniscient judicial authority in the eyes of the jurors--can
be great, particularly when that authority figure requests the jury's division.6 8
The Michigan Supreme Court expounded on this coercive impact
of a numerical inquiry in People v. Wilson,69 in which it said:
Whenever the question of numerical division of a jury is asked
from the bench, in the context of an inquiry into the progress of deliberation, it carries the improper suggestion that the state of numerical division reflects the stage of the deliberations. It has the doubly
coercive effect of melting the resistance of the minority and freezing
the determination of the majority.7 °
This language was explained in People v. Lawson,7 in which the court
said that "[s]uch an inquiry . . . carries the improper suggestion that
the numerical division at the preliminary stage of deliberation is releand distinct roles of thejudge and of the jury are set, and neither is allowed to invade the province
of the other. The judge should not intrude upon the jury process, from a procedural viewpoint,
regardless of any possible coercive factor. It might be argued that these procedural roles are part
of the sixth amendment jury trial right and thus constitutionally imposed upon state criminal
trials. In rebuttal, it can be argued that they are only formal aspects of the jury trial right and, by
analogy to Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972) (less than unanimous jury verdicts), and
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (less than 12 member jury), not constitutionally required.
65. Coercion has been defined in many different ways. In discussions of the closely analogous Allen charge issue, for example, coercion has been defined as meaning "that the charge is
capable of causing a minority juror to substitute the majority's opinion for his own-not that he is
persuaded to reach a different decision, but that he accepts the majority view in spite of his own
conviction as to the defendant's guilt or innocence," Comment, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 386, 386-87
(1964), and "any combination of influences which may tend to cause a doubting juror to join in a
unanimous decision while doubt still exists within him as to the propriety of that verdict," Comment, 6 U.S.F. L. REv. 326, 332 (1972).
66. 272 U.S. at 450.
67. See cases cited note 40 supra.
68. See cases cited note 27 supra. A judge may also improperly influence ajury by reflecting
on the individual jurors personally in his remarks. See note 29 supra. It has been suggested that
an "imputation of stubbornness, or worse," may result if the numerical division of the jury is
publicly revealed. Kesley v. United States, 47 F.2d 453, 454 (5th Cir. 1931).
69. 390 Mich. 689, 213 N.W.2d 193 (1973).
70. Id at 692, 213 N.W.2d at 195.
71. 56 Mich. App. 100, 223 N.W.2d 716 (1974).
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vant to what the final verdict will, or should, be."72 The court also

found that by establishing a "majority view," an inquiry has a coercive
effect because "[i]t places the trial court's imprimatur upon what was
but a tentative result. '7 3 Thus, a request for the majority-minority

count by the judge may have the effect of locking the jury into that
count. This judicial "recognition" of the numerical split may carry an
implication of judicial suggestion that the minority jurors should
"come to" the majority in the further deliberations, with the rejection
of the possibility of the majority "coming to" the minority. The numerical division is judicially "sanctioned" as the starting point in the further deliberations, and a renewal of deliberations by the jury
unrestrained by their previous vote is spumed. From this improper
may
starting point, the minority jurors, implicitly rebuked by the judge,
74
majority.
the
of
position
"approved"
apparently
the
to
give in
72. Id at -, 223 N.W.2d at 719. This may have been suggested in Bra76eld when the Court
said that the inquiry "can rarely be resorted to without bringing to bear in some degree, serious
although not measurable, an improper influence upon the jury, from whose deliberations every
consideration, other than that of the evidence and the law as expounded in a proper charge,
should be excluded." 272 U.S. at 450. Because the practice is not a part of the law or evidence
developed at trial, the jury's use of prior ballots in its deliberations has been condemned for violating due process and possibly interfering with the reasonable doubt standard. See Comment, 15
SANTA CLARA LAW. 939, 948 (1975); Comment, 36 TENN. L. REv. 749, 754 (1969); Comment, 6
U.S.F. L. REv. 326, 334 (1972) ("The imposition of outside evidence also plays havoc with the
concept of'reasonable doubt'. . . . Tentative opinions or ballots of the jury members should play
no role in a dissenting juror's change of position. There is no connection between the majority
view and the reasonableness of an individual juror's doubt."). But see Comment, 53 OR. L. REV.
213, 224 (1974).
73. 56 Mich. App. 100, -, 223 N.W.2d 716, 719 (1974).
74. Coercion and its influence on policy choices can also be seen in the following related
areas that are offshoots of the basic Brasje/d issue:
(a) Nonnumerical disclosure ofjury division-Generally, courts that have applied the Brasfleld
rule to a request for the jury's numerical split have also applied it when the judge asks for the jury
division in nonnumerical terms. See Jacobs v. United States, 279 F.2d 826, 828 (8th Cir. 1960)
(inquiry into whether division very largely one-sided or whether equal; foreman's response that it
was "[n]ot equally divided"); United States v. Samuel Dunkel & Co., 173 F.2d 506, 508, 510 (2d
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 930 (1951) (inquiry into whether equal division or pronounced
majority; foreman's response that there was "a majority, very much") ("There seems no justification for advancing fine differentiations resting upon the non-use of specific numbers or upon the
nomenclature employed in the isolating of that minority. Practically the possibilities of coercion
...
); Nigro v. United States, 4 F.2d 781, 785 (8th Cir. 1925), affTd, 276 U.S. 332
seem the same.
(1927) (predominance); Stewart v. United States, 300 F. 769, 782-87 (8th Cir. 1924) (large preponderance).
(b) Disclosure of evenly divided jury-There has been a split of decisions concerning whether
the Braeld rule should be applied when the judge's inquiry reveals an even division of the jury
(either an "equally divided" or "six to six" answer). It is submitted that Bras.feld should not be
used to find reversible error on these facts. When the jury is equally divided, there is no minority
to coerce. Compare Berger v. United States, 62 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1932) ("[s]ix and six"; reversible error) and Jordan v. United States, 22 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1927) ("about evenly divided";
reversible error) with Anderson v. United States, 262 F.2d 764, 774 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 360
U.S. 929 (1959) ("pretty evenly divided"; no error) ("no minority to coerce") and Note, Due Proc-
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If a judicial inquiry does coerce a jury, a constitutional argument

exists that a defendant's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury has
been violated.7 5 But the Brasfield decision, and the conclusions relied

upon by the Supreme Court in finding the inquiry reversible error,
have been criticized by both courts76 and commentators. 77 The priess, JudicialEconomy and the Hung Jury: 4 Reexamination of the Allen Charge, 53 VA. L. REv.
123, 132 (1967); 16 CALIF. L. REV. 325 passim (1928).
(c) Disclosure of jury's numerical division on conviction or acquittal-It is generally felt that
this disclosure creates a greater potential for prejudice than disclosure of numerical division alone.
Even courts that do not follow Orasf6eldoften find coercion when an inquiry reveals the jury's
verdict split as well as its numerical division. An accompanying Allen charge will usually increase
the probability of these courts finding coercion and thus reversible error. See People v. Carter, 68
Cal. 2d 810, 815 n.3, 816, 442 P.2d 353, 356 n.3, 357, 69 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300 n.3, 301 (1968) (en
banc); Huffaker v. State, 119 Ga. App. 742, 742-43, 168 S.E.2d 895, 896-97 (1969) (cert. denied);
State v. Middleton, 218 S.C. 452, 457, 63 S.E.2d 163, 165-66 (1951); 16 CALIF. L. REv. 325, 327
(1928). But see State v. McClendon, 37 N.C. App. 230, 245 S.E.2d 571 (1978) (no error although
judge was advised after inquiry that jury stood 11 to I for guilty); Comment, 6 U.S.F. L. REv. 326,
336-37 & n.67 (1972) (argument that coercion lies in the Allen instruction itself, and not the
judge's knowledge of the verdict split).
(d) Numerical division volunteered by jury-Most courts in this situation find no error because
of the lack of a judicial inquiry. These decisions reflect a reluctance to extend Brasfield See, e.g.,
United States v. Williams, 444 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335
(4th Cir. 1970); United States v. Rao, 394 F.2d 354, 356 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,393 U.S. 845 (1968);
Bowen v. United States, 153 F.2d 747, 752 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 835 (1946); Hyman
Reiver & Co. v. Rose, 51 Del. 397, 409, 147 A.2d 500, 507 (1958) (civil case). But the same
coercive effects may result when the judge is informed of the split voluntarily by the jury. The
numerical split is usually brought out in open court, and the jury is aware that the judge knows of
the split. Also, a subsequent Allen charge would have the same coercive effect regardless of
whether the split was volunteered or requested. Therefore, a distinction between the two situations should not be made. See United States v. Noah, 594 F.2d 1303, 1306 (9th Cir. 1979)
(Kilkenny, J., dissenting); 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 296, 307 (1972); 42 TENN. L. REv. 803, 811 (1975);
Comment, 36 TENN. L. Rev. 749, 759 (1969); Note, Due Process,JudicialEconomy and the Hung
Jury. A Reexamination of the Allen Charge, 53 VA. L. REv. 123, 131 (1967).
75. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
76. In United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1961), the court found that an inquiry
regarding the substantial majority-minority standing of the jury preceding an Allen charge was a
"trifling addition" to the charge that added little to the charge's coercive potential. Id at 435-36.
The court also rejected the Braseld conclusion that an inquiry is a useless practice. Id at 435
("not such a purposeless thing").
The rule was also criticized in United States v. Samuel Dunkel & Co., 173 F.2d 506 (2d Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 930 (1951), by a Second Circuit panel consisting of Learned Hand,
Thomas Swan and Charles Clark. Although a nonnumerical disclosure was involved, the court
felt itself bound by the federal precedents and declined to distinguish the case from Braeld. But
the panel was critical of the result and said:
We are bound to say that we do not feel happy over the result, for here the defendants
appear to have had the benefit of the most careful deliberation by the jury and it is
certainly doubtful whether in fact the judge's remarks may have had any effect in restricting or controlling the deliberations. Here was a long and difficult trial, where the
evidence of guilt was substantial, now upset after a seven weeks' effort for this one perhaps doubtful slip. . . . This case does not make for seemly law administration. But the
federal precedents are compelling and we would hardly improve the situation by trying
to introduce into the system refined distinctions lacking substance.
Id at 511 (footnote omitted); see note 74(a) supra;cf. United States v. Noah, 594 F.2d 1303, 130507 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kilkenny, J., dissenting), discussedin note 79 infra.
77. See, e.g., L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL, 467-68 (1947); 8
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mary reason for this criticism is the feeling of many critics that the
inquiry alone is not coercive per se. 78 Therefore, the inquiry itself
should not be error, or at the most only harmless error.79 It is suggested
that the coercion, if any, comes not from the inquiry itself but from the
conduct of the judge after the inquiry. 0 Any suggestive or coercive
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 680-81 n.3 (3d ed. 1940) (describing Bra6eldas a "finical spirit" that has
"not scrupled to delay the course ofjustice for this petty cause"); Comment, 53 OR. L. REv. 213,
223-24 (1974); Note, 78 YALE L.J. 100, 132-33 (1968) ("judicial ignorance," "foolish," "the most
conclusory reasoning," which is "almost certainly wrong."); 16 CALIF. L. REV. 325 (1928); 27
COLUM. L. REV. 756 (1927); 41 HARV. L. REV. 797 (1928); 25 MICH. L. REV. 687 (1927); 76 U. PA.
L. REV. 622 (1928); 3 VAND. L. REv. 123 (1949).
78. See, e.g., Huffaker v. State, 119 Ga. App. 742, 742, 168 S.E.2d 895, 896 (1969) (cerl.
denied); Sharplin v. State, 330 So. 2d 591, 596 (Miss. 1976); State v. Baker, 293 S.W.2d 900, 905
(Mo. 1956); L. ORFIELD, supra note 77, at 467; 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 693 n.3 (McNaughton
rev. 1961); 41 HARV. L. REv. 797, 797 (1928); 25 MICH. L. REV. 687, 687 (1927). One court has
even suggested that such an inquiry may have beneficial effects. See text accompanying note 87
infra.
79. It has been suggested that the Brarfleldprohibition did not survive the Supreme Court's
adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See United States v. Noah, 594 F.2d 1303,
1305 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kilkenny, J., dissenting). Judge Kilkenny argued that any inquiry is now, at
best, only harmless error under Rule 52(a). Id at 1305 (dissenting opinion). Under that rule, an
error is disregarded if it does not affect substantial rights. FED. R. CRINI. P. 52(a).
A few federal courts have found a judicial inquiry to be harmless error despite the reversal in
Bra56eld See Beale v. United States, 263 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1959); Butler v. United States, 254
F.2d 875 (5th Cir. 1958). In Beale, the jury had deliberated only 12 minutes before returning for
lunch. An inquiry made at that time was disregarded because the court felt BrayFeldwas flexible
enough to allow a finding of harmless error. 263 F.2d at 217. In Buler, the jury had been out for
only 45 minutes when the judge recalled them in order to make lunch plans. A subsequent inquiry was viewed by the court as harmless error. 254 F.2d at 876. These cases rely on the belief
that the inquiry was made only for the purpose of arranging a suitable time for taking a lunch
break and did not have any coercive effect. Therefore, any error present is harmless. It has been
suggested that these cases create a limited exception to the general Brapleld rule of automatic
reversal. See Annot., 77 A.L.R.3d 769, 775 (1977). It is submitted, however, that these cases are
distinguishable from BraTfleld and do not really involve an exception to the rule. Whereas the
judge in Bra6eldinquired into the division of an apparently deadlocked jury, in Beale and Buller
the inquiry occurred only a short time after the jury began deliberations. Thus, there really did
not exist a situation in which the jury was unable to agree after deliberating for a substantial
period of time, as occurred in Bra6eld.
80. In Sharplin v. State, 330 So. 2d 591 (Miss. 1976), the Mississippi Supreme Court summarized this notion as follows:
[Tihe mere request and receipt of the jury's numerical division without reference to guilt
or innocence does not coerce the jury and is not error. We believe that the possibility of
coercion, if any, lies in the trial judge's conduct and comment after he receives the division, that is, whether the judge merely affords the jury additional time to deliberate or
whether he attempts to force a verdict by suggestive comments or coercive measures.
Id at 596; Vf. 42 TENN. L. REV. 803 (1975), in which the author states:
The danger of any inquiry into the division of the jury results from the fact that the
inquiry is generally followed by an instruction that the jury continue deliberations in an
effort to reach a verdict. It has been suggested, however, that the coercive effect of the
inquiry itself is minimal since the jurors are already aware of their split and little additional pressure is created by the fact that the judge also knows of the division. This
reasoning appears to ignore the fact that the judge, armed with this information, must
determine the length of the jury's further deliberations and the language of his further
instructions. The judge can control either in such a way as to place more or less pressure
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conduct by the judge in conjunction with the inquiry, beyond merely
sending the jury back into deliberations, could be viewed as impermissibly coercive and thus reversible error. An Allen charge following the
inquiry would be an example of a potentially coercive combination.8 '
The second major reason developed from the Brayfeld decision for
condemning a judicial inquiry into a jury's numerical division is that
the inquiry invades the province of the jury and affects the proper roles
of the judge and jury. In Brasfield, the Supreme Court specifically
found that an inquiry "affects the proper relations of the court to the
jury."8 " Courts have relied on this factor to find that such an inquiry
by the court may constitute an invasion of the province and sanctity of
the jury and its deliberation process.8 3 It has been suggested that the
basis for the Braofeld decision was the extreme sensitivity of the
84
Supreme Court to communications between the court and the jury.

Because intrusion upon the jury process is feared, courts may be overly
prone to protect the jury from the influence of the judge. This concern

for the judge-jury relationship may help explain why the numerical inquiry itself was condemned in 85Brafield, despite the apparent lack of
coercion per se in the practice.
upon the jury to reach a verdict, and he may be more likely to make a calculated use of
these devices to produce a verdict if the division of the jury is eleven to one rather than
seven to five.
Id at 812 (footnotes omitted).
81. See Kersey v. State, 525 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Tenn. 1975); 25 MICH. L. REv. 687, 687 (1927);
Comment, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 386, 388 (1964). For an explanation of an Allen change, see note 17
.-upra,

In most cases in which the judge inquires into the jury's numerical division, he also gives an
A1llen charge or a form thereof. It can be argued that both an inquiry and an Allen charge should

be present before an appellate court can find reversible error because of coercion; an inquiry alone
would not be enough. This combination of inquiry and Allen charge was present in both Burton
and Brasfield. Although it might be argued that the Supreme Court based its finding of reversible
error in Bra 6eld on this combination, the Supreme Court addressed only the inquiry issue and
never reached the Allen charge issue. Moreover, the Court remarked "that the inquiry itself
should be regarded as ground for reversal." 272 U.S. at 450. See generall, United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433, 435 & n.5 (4th Cir. 1961); Comment, 36 TENN. L. REv. 749, 758-59 (1969); Note,
supra note 74, at 131 & n.43.
82. 272 U.S. at 450.
83. See Beale v. United States, 263 F.2d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 1959) ("serious invasion of the
jury's exclusive domain"); Hyman Reiver & Co. v. Rose, 51 Del. 397, 409, 147 A.2d 500, 507
(1958) (privacy invasion); State v. Middleton, 218 S.C. 452, 457, 63 S.E.2d 163, 165 (1951); Kersey
v. State, 525 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Tenn. 1975) ("Until the jury shall have reached a verdict, no onenot even the trial judge-has any right, reason or power to question the specifics of its deliberative
efforts.").
84. L. ORFIELD, supra note 77, at 467-68; 41 HARV. L. REv. 797, 797 (1928); cf.State v.
Streyar, 119 Ariz. 607, 609, 583 P.2d 263, 265 (Ct. App. 1978) (condemning potentially prejudicial
judge-jury communications when not in open court in presence of defendant and counsel).
85. See United States v. Hayes, 446 F.2d 309, 312 (5th Cir. 1971) (presence or absence of
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Finally, an inquiry into the numerical division of a jury has been
condemned because the practice is deemed to be useless. The Bra§6eld
Court found it "never useful." 6 Some courts, however, have disagreed
with this conclusion. They have found the practice useful in gauging

the probability of agreement among the jurors for the purpose of deciding whether to dismiss a deadlocked jury or send it back into deliberations."7 But, as the Braifleld Court noted, this same advantage can be
achieved by other forms of inquiry that do not require a disclosure of
the jury's numerical division."8 Judicial approval has been given to

reasonable, noncoercive questioning of the jury about the probability
of agreement among its members.8

9

Therefore, while the numerical in-

coercion not a controlling factor because Bra /6eld also condemned an inquiry on grounds separate from coercion).
It can be argued that this concern is controlling because the Supreme Court condemned the
inquiry in Brasp6eld, yet approved a potentially more coercive practice in the Allen charge, See
United States v. Noah, 594 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1979) (applying Bra@fteld rule). In Noah, Judge
Kilkenny argued in dissent that a h'raleldinquiry was harmless when compared to the far more
coercive, yet approved, Allen charge. Id at 1305 (Kilkenny, J., dissenting). The majority responded by finding the equation of the Bra-ield rule with the Allen charge fallacious:
[T]here is another factor that must be taken into account. This is that the slightest intrusion upon the privacy of a jury's deliberation should not be allowed and the bar to such
intrusion should not. . . be impaired, even to the slightest degree. It is inconceivable
.. . that some of the nine Justices who issued the Brayfield principle did not weigh this
consideration.
Id at 1304-05 n.2.
86. 272 U.S. at 450.
87. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433, 435-36 (4th Cir. 1961); Sharplin v. State,
330 So. 2d 591, 596 (Miss. 1976); Joyner v. State, 484 P.2d 560, 562 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971). See
generally L. ORFIELD, supra note 77, at 467; 16 CALIF. L. REv. 325, 328-29 (1928); 41 HAIRv. L.
REv. 797, 797-98 (1928); 76 U. PA. L. REv. 622, 623 (1928); Comment, 6 U.S.F. L. REv. 326, 336
n.66 (1972). See also 78 YALE L.J. 100, 133 (1968) (inquiry helps judge discover and remedy a
withdrawal from participation).
Other courts discount the usefulness of the practice. In People v. Wilson, 390 Mich. 689, 691,
213 N.W.2d 193, 195 (1973), the court stated: "It cannot be supposed that a jury is closer to
agreement-in point of time-when it stands at II to 1 than when it stands at 8 to 4 or 6 to 6."
The argument is that it cannot be determined, from an eleven to one split, how long it will take the
one to join the majority. The holdout may quickly join the others, or may never join. This is
assuming that the one should join the eleven; perhaps the eleven should join the view of the one.
Although this argument may be theoretically correct, in practice it appears that the advantages do
exist. An eleven to one split is often resolved much sooner than a more even division. See 16
CALIF. L. REv. 325, 329 n.20 (1928).
88. "Such procedure serves no useful purpose that cannot be attained by questions not requiring the jury to reveal the nature or extent of its division." 272 U.S. at 450.
89. For example, a judge can ask the members of the jury about any problems they are
having and whether they think they will be able to agree. From these questions and other circumstances, such as the length of jury deliberation and the volume and complexity of the evidence, a
judge can assess the probability of the jury's reaching a verdict, without an inquiry into its numerical split. See State v. Boogaard, 90 Wash. 2d 733, 738, 585 P.2d 789, 793 (1978). For examples of
reasonable questioning, see United States v. Mack, 249 F.2d 321 (7th Cir. 1957), cerl denied, 356
U.S. 920 (1958); People v. Maxwell, 3 Mich. App. 264, 142 N.W.2d 40 (1966). Some courts have
developed procedures to ensure that the numerical division of the jury is not revealed when the
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quiry may be helpful in determining the probability of agreement, it is
certainly not essential, and its usefulness is outweighed by its potential
for prejudice.9°
Having disposed of the Brayfield rule as an administrative, rather
than a constitutional, one, the Ellis court adopted the "totality of the
circumstances" test as the standard for determining whether an inquiry
into the numerical division of the jury constitutes reversible error.9 1
Unlike the Braleldper se rule, in which prejudice is presumed and the
use of a numerical inquiry alone constitutes reversible error, under the
totality test a finding of actual prejudice is required and the use of the
numerical inquiry is reviewed to determine if coercion has resulted.92
Although this test has been used extensively by those courts that have
refused to follow Brafield,93 the totality test may prove to be ineffective.
It is the difficulty of proof of actual prejudice under the totality of
the circumstances test that constitutes perhaps the best argument for
finding the numerical inquiry unconstitutional, or at least for prohibiting the practice through an administrative rule. Because of this difficulty, the potential for prejudice and coercion from an inquiry should
be enough to constitute a violation of due process, 94 and proof of actual
prejudice should not be required. This problem of proof in turn creates
difficulties of appellate review of trial court convictions in which such
an inquiry has occurred.9" The Supreme Court in Braotield recognized
this problem when it said that an inquiry's "effect upon a divided jury
will often depend upon circumstances which cannot properly be known
to the trial judge or to the appellate courts. 9 6 The problem is that it is
not known how such an inquiry affects a juror. A court cannot find out
because it is forbidden from inquiring into jury deliberations. Even if a
jury is questioned. See People v. Luther, 53 Mich. App. 648, -, 219 N.W.2d 812, 814 (1974),
a 'd, 394 Mich. 619, 232 N.W.2d 184 (1975); Kersey v. State, 525 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Tenn. 1975).
90. That the Brayfeld Court was actually applying this sort of balancing test is evidenced by
its statement that the numerical inquiry is "never useful and. . . generally harmful." 272 U.S. at
450. It has been suggested that because such an inquiry is useless, the Supreme Court condemned
it in order to establish a uniform rule for the federal courts. See 3 VAND. L.REv. 123, 124 (1949).
91. 596 F.2d at 1198-99.
92. Id at 1199.
93. Id; see cases cited note 46 supra.
94. This theory has been used in arguing that an Allen charge is unconstitutional. The Allen
charge situation is closely analogous to the judicial inquiry issue, and the same constitutional
arguments are applicable to each. See Comment, 6 U.S.F. L. REv. 326, 333-34 (1972) (Allen
charge). Contra,4 HARV. L. REv. 797, 797 (1928); 3 VAND. L. REv. 123, 123 (1949).
95. See Comment, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 939, 948 (1975) (Allen charge issue); Comment, 6
U.S.F. L. REv. 326, 338 (1972) (Allen charge issue).
96. 272 U.S. at 450.
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court could review the deliberations of the jury, many subjective influences of an inquiry could not be discovered. These effects would be
locked away forever in the minds of the individual jurors, who may
never realize that their decision was subconsciously influenced. 97
Therefore, a totality of the circumstances test, as suggested by Ellis and
the other courts rejecting the Brayfield rule, may be an ineffective
method for an appellate court's determination of whether a jury verdict
has been coerced.
This argument for the unconstitutionality of a judicial inquiry has
been summarized as follows:
When the coercive impact of a questionable practice cannot be assessed accurately, pragmatic concern for defendants' rights, impartial
trial and the integrity of the jury process dictates that the use of a
questionable [practice] be proscribed. There is danger that where
proof of prejudice is difficult, a defendant's right to a fair trial by an
impartial jury will be violated with a consequent denial of due process. Where practical considerations pose special difficulties of proof
in regard to vital rights,
policy supports the formation of practices to
98
protect those rights.

Therefore, under this argument, when the coerciveness of a practice
such as a numerical inquiry is questioned, any doubt should be bal-

anced in favor of the defendant's right to a fair trial by an impartial
jury. The Supreme Court has used this theory, for example, in excess
publicity cases, 99 to dispense with proof of actual prejudice when such

proof is difficult to obtain. This same theory might be used to find a
97. See generally Comment, 6 U.S.F. L. REv. 326, 338 (1972) (Allen charge issue).
98. Fields v. State, 487 P.2d 831, 839 (Alaska 1971) (footnote omitted) (condemning an Allen
charge).
99. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965);
cf.Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504 (1976) ("The actual impact of a particular practice on the
judgment of jurors cannot always be fully determined. . . .Courts must do the best they can to
evaluate the likely effects of a particular procedure, based on reason, principle, and common
human experience.").
In Estes, the Supreme Court stated: "It is true that in most cases involving claims of due
process deprivations we require a showing of identifiable prejudice to the accused. Nevertheless,
at times a procedure employed by the state involves such a probability that prejudice will result
that it is deemed inherently lacking in due process." 381 U.S. at 542-43 (citing In re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133 (1955); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)).
In Murchison, the Court discussed this theory of due process:
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of
course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of law has
always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. . . . But to perform
its high function in the best way "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."
349 U.S. at 136 (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. I1,14 (1954)).
In Tumey, the Supreme Court commented:
to
Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man ..
forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him
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violation of due process in a numerical inquiry because of the possibility of coercion inherent in the practice. Even if this argument does not
reach a constitutional dimension, the theory could also be used by the
state courts in finding reversible error. The potential harm inherent in
the use of the numerical inquiry outweighs any potential benefit to such
an extent that state courts should take it upon themselves to establish
an administrative rule striking down the practice.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the court of appeals decided Ellis
v. Reed correctly, but for the wrong reasons. The complete absence of
constitutional citation by the Supreme Court in Bra.5eld and the "administration" language of Burton combine to support the conclusion
that Brafieldwas decided as an exercise of the Supreme Court's supervisory powers and not as a constitutional limitation applicable to state
courts.100 This reasoning, however, can be criticized. On the other
hand, the Ellis court also failed to address adequately the reasoning of
the Brafeld Court, particularly on the crucial issue of coercion. Of the
reasons presented by the Braffield Court, the coerciveness of the numerical inquiry is the one that borders most on the question of constitutionality. Because a numerical inquiry alone is not coercive, this
question should probably be answered in favor of the constitutionality
of the practice. Thus, the Ellis court's ultimate decision that Braffeld
established an administrative, rather than a constitutional, rule is vindicated most successfully not by an examination of the citation in Brasfield or the language in Burton, but by an analysis of the substantive
reasons given for the Brasfield decision.
Although the numerical inquiry is not coercive per se, in combination with other factors-such as suggestive remarks by the judge, the
disclosure of the jury's division of opinion about guilt or innocence and
0
possibility of coercion increases, and
especially an Allen charge ' °-the
the situation should be scrutinized closely, with any doubt balanced in
favor of defendants' rights. The totality of the circumstances test, with
its problem of proving actual prejudice, however, makes such balancing extremely difficult, if not impossible. Therefore, even if an inquiry
into the jury's numerical division is not itself unconstitutional, its use in
not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused, denies the
latter due process of law.

273 U.S. at 532.
100. See text accompanying notes 50-63 supra.
101. In Ellis, an inquiry was combined with a modified version of the Allen charge. The
charge was, however, relatively mild, and the court of appeals found it not coercive. 596 F.2d at
1196-97; see note 17 supra.
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state trials should be condemned as improper and useless. The advantages of such a practice can be achieved by other forms of judicial inquiry, not involving a numerical division disclosure, that do not have
the same potential for prejudice. Any possible benefits of numerical
inquiry are outweighed by the potential harm inherent in such a practice.
Unfortunately, the ambiguities of the Braseld decision have created confusion among the courts. As Ellis demonstrates, this confusion
has led to the distraction of judicial analysis from the substantive merits of the numerical inquiry-primarily its potential for coercion-to
the decisional basis for the Brasfieldrule. It is thus incumbent upon the
Supreme Court to combine its condemnation of the numerical inquiry
in Brafteld with a clear statement on the constitutionality of the practice. Even if the numerical inquiry is not found to be unconstitutional,
its widespread use in state trials is certainly improper and should be
checked. This result apparently will not be reached, however, until
state and federal courts are forced to address the merits of the numerical inquiry by an unequivocal decision by the United States Supreme
Court on the constitutionality of its use.
MALLARD GUY BROOKS,
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